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SECURITISED ETHNIC IDENTITIES AND
COMMUNAL CONFLICTS:
A Need for Problem-Constructing Conflict Resolution?
Tarja Väyrynen

The paper is inspired by Ernesto Laclau's (1996, p. 46) observation of the terrain into which
history has thrown us. The terrain is characterised by:
[...] the multiplication of new--and not so new--identities as a result of the collapse of the places from
which the universal subject spoke--explosion of ethnic and national identities in Eastern Europe and in
the territories of the former USSR, struggles of immigrant groups in Western Europe, new forms of
multicultural protest and self-assertion in the U.S., to which we have to add the gamut of forms of
contestation associated with the new social movements.
More specifically, the aim of the paper is to discuss why 'violent ethnic identification' takes place. In
other words, it is asked why ethnicity is seen to be the point of identification in the late modern world
and why it is a source (actual and rhetoric) of violent performances. A tentative answer is given by
studying the features of modernity and the social practices which are embedded in the modern
condition. Furthermore, the question of conflict resolution is entertained in the paper. Given the nature
of modern practices and agency they produce, it is asked what are the conditions of conflict resolution,
and what is the political space of conflict resolution in the world of 'ethnic conflict.'

At the center of the question, 'why violent ethnic identification' takes place, is the question 'why
do some identities become securitised,' i.e. perceived to be threatened in a manner that the way to
maintain (or, rather, 'construct') the identity becomes to be seen to be an issue of survival. In
general, issues become securitised when leaders (whether political, societal, or intellectual) begin
to talk about them in terms of existential threats against some valued referent object.
Securitization is, thus, in essence, an intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a
saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects requiring emergency measures outside the
normal bounds of political procedure (see Buzan, 1997; Waever et al., 1993; Neumann, 1997).
For example, the process of the break down of Yugoslavia was a process of securitising
collective identities and of perceiving and expressing the issue of identity in terms of collective
survival.
Furthermore, it needs to be asked why securitised identity leads to violent performances. It
should be noted that violence may have its own instrumental rationale, i.e. is more than that (see
Arendt, 1970). Violence is also a transformative prcts poles of enactment and reception.
Furthermore, violence can detach itself from initial contexts and become the condition of its own
reproduction. It may become an institution possessing its own symbolic and performative
autonomy as has happened for example, according to Feldman, in Northern Ireland. Violent
performances construe and construct novel subject positions (1991, p. 21). In other words, they
do not arise from fixed subject positions or from fixed identities (ibid, pp. 20-21). A 'Tamil
Tiger' performing a violent act is not a fixed historical agent behaving violently. He or she has,

rather, a subject position in violent practices--a position of enactment and reception which is
continuously created and transformed, and which continuously produces his or her identity as a
'Tamil Tiger.'

The Process of Ethnic Identification in Lebenswelt

In order to understand 'violent ethnic identification' the condition of human existence needs to be
discussed. The study needs, thus, to start with the description of the structures of the life-world
(Lebenswelt) of social actors and ask whether there is something in these structures which make
ethnic identification particularly important and prone to violence.
Man (the unfortunate English word 'man' refers to both women and men) is born into a world
that existed before her or his birth. This world is from the outset not merely a physical but also a
sociocultural one. The sociocultural world is a preconstituted and preorganised world whose
particular structure is the result of a historical process and is therefore different for each culture
and society. The social world is experienced by man as a web of social relationships, of systems,
signs, and institutionalised forms of social organisation (Schutz, 1964, pp. 226-231).
The meaning of the elements of the social world is taken for granted by those living in the world.
There are cultural patterns which are peculiar to social groups and which function as
unquestioned schemes of reference to members of a group. In Alfred Schutz's words, "any
member born or reared within the group accepts the ready-made standardised scheme of the
cultural pattern handed down to him by ancestors, teachers, and authorities as an unquestioned
and unquestionable guide in all situations which normally occur within the social world" (1964,
p. 49). Being a member of a community is tantamount to being supplied with guaranteed,
'objective' criteria of relevance and knowledge which are taken for granted. The criteria of
relevance and knowledge (cultural pattern) give a sense of security and assurance to those
belonging to the social group.
Man approaches the world through typifications. Typifications are fundamentally intersubjective
and are mainly formed by others, such as predecessors or contemporaries, as appropriate tools
for coming to terms with things and men. They are accepted as such by the group into which
man was born. Thus, the knowledge of typifications and of their appropriate use is an inseparable
element of the sociocultural heritage handed down to the person and stored to person's 'stock of
knowledge.' Knowledge included in the individual stock is, therefore, largely socially derived,
distributed and approved. (Schutz, 1964, pp. 120-134; Schutz and Luckmann, 1974, pp. 261262.)
From the point of view of the society, any society considers itself as a little cosmos, and the
maintenance of the cosmos requires symbols to keep it together. Societies and social groups need
their central myths, or dominating ideologies, to justify and to establish foundations for selfinterpretation. The central myth, as a scheme of self-interpretation, belongs to the relative natural
conception of the world which the in-group takes for granted (Schutz, 1964, pp. 95-104, 113114, 121, 129, 227, 230, 236, 244-245, 255; Vaitkus, 1991, p. 82).

Ethnicity guides interpretation and action in the social world. It is, thus, a part of the frame of
reference of the social group in terms of which both the physical as well as sociocultural world is
interpreted. It is an element of the frame of reference which consists of the sum-total of the
various typifications. In other words, ethnicity is a way to typify the world, others and one-self,
and as such it implies roles and ways to act. As Max Weber argues, the existence of a marriage
or a state means nothing but the mere chance that people will act and will act in a specific way.
Similarly, following Schutz's terminology, the existence of an ethnic group means nothing but
the mere likelihood that people will act in accordance with the general framework of
typifications in which ethnicity, as a reference to certain criteria of communality (e.g. language,
history, 'race'), is considered to have high relevance.
Although ethnicity can be a part of the relative natural conception of the world of the social
group, it is not a stabile element. On the contrary, its meaning and content are constantly
negotiated in the social interaction between social actors. In other words, it is continuously
negotiated in encounters which are political and involve power (on the political nature of human
encounters see Arendt 1958, pp. 178-184). As Hanna Arendt notes on power, it "springs up
whenever people get together and act in concert"(1970, p. 52). Furthermore, ethnicity is
employed in order to draw boundaries as to who belongs to the group and who does not. An
ethnic group is about boundary maintenance; ethnicity is a way to structure interaction which
allows the persistence of differences. Ethnic 'communality' is, therefore, always an artefact of
boundary-drawing activity: always contentious and contested, glossing over some
differentiations and representing some other differences as powerful and separating factors
(Barth, 1969, pp. 9-38; Bauman, 1992, pp. 677-678; for an example see Roosens, 1989).
There is nothing in the structure of the stock of knowledge and the logic of typification which
gives ethnic identification particular importance. The meaning and content of ethnicity are
constantly negotiated and contested in the realm of the political arising from human encounters,
but that does not imply 'violent ethnic identification.' Thus the question, what gives arise to the
move from the realm of political to the realm of violence, remains. It needs to be asked,
therefore, why ethnic identities become securitised in a way that they are perceived to be a threat
to the 'survival' (whatever that term means form the point of view of the actor) to an extent that
violence is assumed to be a suitable means or institution to secure the identity.
One answer, given from a post-structuralist perspective, claims that in the (late) modern
condition there is a constitutive relationship between the political and violence. The answer
studied in the paper will, by being post-structurally oriented, also reshape the original question
on securitization and agency involved in the act. Namely, it will shift the emphasis from an actor
'doing the (speech) act of securitization,' to social practices which give rise to agencies prone to
securitization and violent identification.

The (Late) Modern Condition: Order, Technology and the Production of Difference

The next step is to assume that our culturally derived, distributed and approved stocks of
knowledge are greatly shaped by modernity and then to ask whether there is something in the

modern content of our stock of knowledge which relates it particularly to violent ethnic
identification.
It should be noted that modernity is a historical period which matured into a cultural project with
the growth of Enlightenment and into a socially accomplished form of life with the growth of
industrial society. One of the tasks modernity set for itself was to bring order into chaos. Ordered
existence required nature, the unordered, to be mastered, subordinated and remade to meet
'human needs.' The unordered needed to be held in check, restrained and contained. The struggle
for order is essentially a fight against ambiguity, ambivalence and fuzziness. Therefore, order is
continuously engaged in the war of survival, the enemy being chaos and chaos being understood
to be pure negativity. In order to be effective, modern mastery requires (and produces) in its will
to design, manipulate and engineer, sovereign agencies aiming at accomplishing the task
(Bauman, 1991, pp. 7-8).
Modernity is also characterised by technology. Technology--in the Heideggerian sense--is
neither the application of science nor does it refer to the mere instruments we associate with
technology. Rather, technology is a mode of thoughtful being characteristic of the Western
metaphysical tradition, manifest through the way we bring things to presence. Technology has
come to fruition in modern times in the form of calculative and instrumental reasoning which
characterises modern rationality. Instrumental reasoning brings things into presence as calculable
matter and helps order them. By enframing things in a certain manner, technology holds them
readily available, in effect, as a kind of objectivised and homogenised form. Things are, thus,
standing in reserve to be employed and re-deployed in continuous exercise of instrumentally
propelled production and consumption (Campbell and Dillon, 1993, pp. 20-24).
Therefore, technology is a mode of thought which is also a mode of practice, a way of being in
the world. We do not have technology, technology has us. By being a mode of thought,
technology relates to political and social life too. As Heidegger argues, all aspects of modern life
are becoming, or have become, determined technologically. In other words, political and social
life are largely technologised. In short, the mode of enframing the world conditioned by
technology prevails also in the spheres of political and social life, not only in the sphere of our
relationship to nature (Ibid.)
It is naturally worth entertaining the question whether the 'world society' is, in its totality,
characterised by technology or whether there are pockets which have escaped it. If there are such
'unmodern islands,' the characteristics suggested below do not apply to them. One way to answer
the question is to claim that the universal 'civilising' and 'modernising' project of European
imperialist expansion has reached all parts of the world, evidenced by the resistance arising out
of other cultures.
Another, and clearly more profound. way to answer the question is to reveal the assumption
underlying it. Namely, the assumption concerning 'otherness.' The question itself supposes 'the
other' which is subtly nativized, placed in a separate frame of analysis and spatially located in
that 'other place' which is proper to an 'other culture.' The unity of 'us' (modern West) and the
otherness of the 'other' (unmodern pocket) is not questioned. The assumption that there are
'unmodern people' does not tackle the core issue, namely, the processes of the production of

difference (us/other) in the world of culturally, socially and economically interconnected and
interdependent spaces. (see Gupta and Ferguson, 1992, pp. 6-23)
The issue is present in Marjorie Shostak's Nisa: The Life and Words of a !Kung Woman and
Edwin Wilmsen's critique of it. Shostak portrays !Kung people in the Kalahari (also known as
'Bushmen') desert as almost living on another planet ('in an isolated unmodern pocket') isolated
from the outside world and, therefore, bound to be traditional and racially distinct. She assumes
the existence of 'the other' in 'other place' as a starting-point for her inquiry. Wilmsen, on the
other hand, starts his Land Filled with Flies: A Political Economy of the Kalahari by asking how
'the Bushmen' came to be Bushmen. He demonstrates that San-speaking people have been in
continuous interaction with other groups for as long as we have evidence for, and that political
and economical relations linked the supposedly isolated desert with a regional political economy
both in the colonial and precolonial era. Moreover, the 'Bushman/San' label is a category which
was produced through the retribalization of the colonial period just half a century ago. (ibid., pp.
14-17)
We are, therefore, not dealing with 'authentic' !Kung society. Rather, we are dealing with an
'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983) whose production has taken place in the conjunctures of
global economics, politics and culture. Thus, the foundational question, 'how difference is
produced,' and not supposing the 'otherness of the other,' gives a totally new account of and
perspective to the assumed political, economical and cultural isolation. Furthermore, it forces us
to explore the contexts in which the production of the 'otherness' is embedded. The following
section outlines some of the contexts or, rather, spaces or 'landscapes' as Arjun Appadurai (1990)
calls them.

Global Economical, Political and Cultural Practices and Spaces

Since technology conditions the way we are in the world by forming a part of the content of our
stock of knowledge, the question arises concerning what kind of social and political practices can
emerge within the framework created by technology. Seen from the angle of ethnic conflict, four
social and political practices are especially important: the sovereign territorial state,
globalisation, capitalism and media practices. All these create an 'identity space' in which ethnic
identification and the production of difference takes place. In short, they are social practices
which shape local ethnic identification and produce parochial 'ethnic subjects.'
The sovereign territorial state and its assumed coexistence with the nation is of a vital
importance in understanding ethnicity, because it is space within which ethnic identification--and
especially violent identification -- often actualises. The sovereign state has traditionally tried to
offer the instrumental solution for the challenge set forth by different forms of identity politics
(e.g. class, gender and ethnic claims). In other words, the state has aimed at providing a shared
domain of meaning for groups located within its sovereign control and territory. The state, as a
social and political practice and as a system of inclusion and exclusion par excellence, has tried
to solve the problem of conflicting identity claims by producing precise distinctions and
differences between citizens and aliens, by domesticating particular identities and by creating a
coherent sovereign identity (for the sovereign state see e.g. Ashley, 1989; Bauman, 1992;

Campbell 1993; Linklater, 1990; Linklater, 1994; Walker, 1993 and, for example, 'imagining'
India Krishna, 1996).
As Bauman describes the modern state:
National states promote 'nativism' and construe its subjects as 'natives.' They laud and enforce the
ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural homogeneity. They are engaged in incessant propaganda of shared
attitudes. They construct joint historical memories and do their best to discredit or suppress such
stubborn memories that cannot be squeezed into a shared tradition--now redefined in the stateappropriate quasi-legal terms, as 'our common heritage.' They preach the sense of common mission,
common fate, common destiny. They breed, or at least legitimize and give tacit support to, animosity
towards everyone standing outside the holy union" (1991, p. 64) [emphasis by Bauman].
This state has become more and more contested space. As Appadurai notes, the 'nation-state' is a battle
of imagination with 'state and nation seeking to cannibalise each other.'(1990, p. 304) Groups with ideas
about nationhood seek to capture or co-opt states power, and states simultaneously seek to capture
and monopolise ideas about nationhood. Here is, thus, a platform for separatism and micro-identities to
become political projects within nation-states. Ideas of nationhood appear to be steadily increasing in
scale and regularly crossing existing state boundaries. Kurds, Sikhs, Tamils, Sri Lankans, and Quebecois
represent 'imagined communities' which seek to create states of their own or carve pieces out of
existing states. States, on the other hand, are seeking to establish the monopoly of producing
distinctions and differences -- a task in which they are never fully successful. From the perspective of the
'nation-state,' an ethnic group claiming a right to produce difference and make distinctions which
transcend the official state ideology is an 'enemy within.' Globalisation as social practice is also
embedded in technology and in its instrumental rationale. Globalisation implies accelerated processes,
growth of global institutions and increased flows of information. It is closely connected with global
capitalism, which is in an interesting contradiction with the maintenance of states and sovereignty for
the political organisation of international relations. Capital flows across national borders and is, thus,
multinational and transnational by nature. Capitol creates and operates in 'finanscape' with fast moving
currency markets, national stock exchanges and commodity speculations (Appadurai, 1990, p.298).

Global capitalism produces, with growing internationalisation of production and finance, global
divisions of labour. The global division of labour has its local counterpart, namely, the
segmenting of labour forces along 'race' and 'ethnic' lines. As Jindy Pettman notes, "the
increasingly global economy shapes the new international division of labour along state,
national, racialized, ethnicized, and gender divides" (1996, p. 264). The international political
economy of, for example, migrant labour is a part of this division, and a motive of huge
population movements (Shapiro, 1996, p. 259, for examples see Pettman, 1996; Soguk, 1996).
The movement of bodies, for whatever reason and among other global flows , deterritorialises
the world assumed to be divided along territorial lines by shifting labouring populations from
poor societies into relatively wealthy societies. Deterritorialisation creates a version of
'ethnoscape' (term Appadurai's) which sometimes has an exaggerated and intensified sense of
criticism or attachment to the politics of the home-state. In other words, identity-building
becomes deterritorialised and assumes an increasingly symbolic character in a nomadic world.
According to Appadurai, deterritorialisation, whether of Hindus, Sikhs, Palestinians or

Ukrainians, is now at the core of a variety of global fundamentalism (1990, p. 301) Invented
homelands can become fantastic and one-sided to the extent that they provide material for new
'ideoscapes' (concentrations of images which have often to do with ideologies of states and their
counter-ideologies) in which ethnic conflict can begin to erupt. The search for identity is,
therefore, at its most intense when identity is located in the not-yet-accomplished future. An
intense search for identity takes place, for example, in the West Bank, Beirut, Jaffna and
'Kurdistan.' They are global/local stages where bloody scenes between existing nation-states and
deterritorialised groupings are acted (Appadurai, 1990; Bauman, 1992).
The media contributes to ethnic identification as well as to the creation of assumed unified
nation-states. As suggested above, ethnic identification consists often of an utopia as a
construction of the future state of affairs in which all differences are reconciled around an unified
body politic. The media works towards this utopia by producing networks of signs and images
representing 'oneness' and 'otherness.' 'Mediascapes' provide large and complex repertoires of
images, narratives, and 'ethnoscapes' to viewers throughout the world. They help to constitute
narratives of the 'other' and proto-narratives of possible lives which can produce a platform for
the desire for acquisition and movement. Furthermore, media helps groups spread over vast and
irregular spaces stay linked together and create political sentiments based on intimacy and
locality (Appadurai, 1990; Schulte-Sasse & Schulte-Sasse, 1991).
Deterritorialisation and dislocation of peoples, thus, does not remove the need for overcoming
separation. Rather, it often enforces the search for unity. Aesthetic experiences of community
which allow experiences of unity or community become more and more important when "the self
seeks to overcome its separation and the extreme differentiation of modern societies by mirroring
itself in signs that facilitate the illusion that the very difference that establishes the sign is
overcome in the experience of the sign" (Schulte-Sasse & Schulte-Sasse, 1991, p. 78). For
example, a state flag is a sign which stems from sovereign state as social practice establishing
differences between citizens and aliens. In other words, differences are constitutive of the sign.
On the other hand, the experience of the sign gives an illusory experience of national unity and
even a community of citizens which overcomes obvious 'internal' differences.
In sum, these global processes, 'landscapes' in Appadurai's words, affect social and political
experiences by creating identity space within which social and political agencies are situated and
within which ethnic identification takes place. The next section examines the constitutive nature
of social practices for political agency and identification.

Political Agency and Security

Social and political agency (subject) is embedded in social practices. In Feldman's words:
"Political agency is not given but achieved on the basis of practices that alter the subject" (1991,
p. 1) Political agency is relational--it has no fixed grounds--it is the effect of situated practices."
In other words, subject becomes articulated through social practice. Agency is not embedded
only in language, but in relational sequences of action. The cultural construction of the political
subject is tied to the cultural construction of history. Political agency is the factored product of
multiple subject positions; there is no guarantee of a unified subject, as actors shift from one

transactional space to another. Agency is not the author, but the product of doing, and, therefore,
formed by a web of subject positions during that doing. It follows that power is embedded in the
situated practices of agents: it is neither a resource nor a capacity (Feldman, 1991, pp. 1-5).
What is characteristic to modernity is the shift of man from object to subject positions: to the
positions where subject has its own verities and laws. The death of the Subject (with a capital S)
has produced a variety of new subject positions, and the production of new subject positions has
accelerated in late modernity. The dynamic of 'subjectivation' expands the categories of who or
what can be a political subject. As Ernesto Laclau argues, the multiplication of new identities as
a result of the collapse of the places from which the universal subject spoke has produced the
explosion of, for example, ethnic and nationalistic identities and, therefore, the sites of political
mobilisation seem to appear in unexpected places (Feldman, 1991, pp. 1-16; Laclau, 1996, p.
46).
David Campbell and Michael Dillon argue that violence has become the ultima ratio of (late)
modern politics, because 'subjectivation' has liberated political understanding and framed the
world in a 'technological' and instrumental manner. The basic political subject is violent by virtue
of its very composition (1993, pp. 1-47). According to Campbell and Dillon, security is the
foundational value around which the political subject revolves. Security is not merely the main
goal of the political subject of violence, it is, rather, the very principle of formation of that
political subject. The political subject of violence, invoking constantly security, comes in a
variety of forms: God, rational subject, nation, state, people, class, race, etc.
Thus, what Campbell and Dillon seem to be arguing is that security and the securitization of an
identity is not a question of a conscious decision of an already existing political subject as Buzan
seems to think. Rather, security is constitutive of political subject, because of the 'technological'
framing of the world modernity offers. Social practices, and agency embedded in them, are
fundamentally, in Campbell's and Dillon's account, organised around and constituted by security.
In a similar vein, Bauman argues that modern 'consciousness' warns and alerts in its will to
control and engineer assumed chaos. Campbell's and Dillon's view of security can be, thus, seen
to imply that the 'ethnic subject' embedded in global practices ('landscapes' and their
conjunctures) is bound to securitise identities and even to seek for violent ethnic identification
due to its composition (1991, p. 9).

Violent Political Identification

Since security comes also in the form of ethnic groups, the modern condition characterised by
dislocation and a variety of forms of alienation works for the processes of violent ethnic
identification and the securitization of ethnic identities. 'Identification' can be best understood in
the light of Lacanian theory, and especially from the angle of void in identification.
Accoy of identification, one needs to identify with something, because there is an original and
insurmountable lack of identity. The lack is, thus, truly constitutive of any identity (see Laclau
and Zac, 1994, pp. 11-39). A vital point from the point of view of 'violent ethnic identification'
needs to be noted: the failure in fully constituting any identity. There is always a void in

identification, which is open to distortions and excesses and which produces anxiety and
uncertainty. The failure of full identification, therefore, triggers new acts of identification which
aim at mastering the disturbing effects.
How does identification, then, relate to securitised identity? The social world presents itself to
us, as argued earlier, largely as a sedimented ensemble of social practices accepted at face value.
We seldom question the founding acts of their institution in our life-world. However, modern
and especially late modern conditions are characterised by increasing awareness of the political
character embedded in the institutions of all social identity. The foundation of institutions and
practices are put more and more into question in the world of 'subjectivation.' In short, the
collapse of the Subject and emerging new subject positions allow the questioning of social
practices. According to Laclau, the less the sedimented social practices are able to ensure social
reproduction, the more new acts of political intervention and identification are socially required
(1994, pp. 3-4). This leads, as Laclau argues, to politicization (and securitization) of social
identities as well as proliferation of particularistic political identities.
The opening up of new subject positions in the late modern condition, facilitated by
deterritorialisation and dislocation of people, enable the questioning the political foundations of
social institutions. Political and social practices and institutions are essentially contingent and,
thus, open to contestation, and therefore antagonism. Especially in a time of rapid change when
new forms of life emerge too fast to be absorbed and domesticated by the old mechanisms of
control and mental frames, new subject positions arise which enable, in Bauman's words, the
lifting of "identity to the level of awareness, making it into a task" (1992, p. 680). An attempt to
complete the task of identity-making is pursued through imagining of communities; imaging of
communities which are founded on securitised and exclusive identities
'Ethnocraft' (the term is derived from Richard Ashley's discussion on statecraft, see Ashley,
1989, pp. 301-309) which works at the local level, but in the conjunctures of global practices,
finalises the processes of shaping and securitising identities. It is the knowledgeable practice by
which ethnic communities of men are differentiated in space and time. Ethnocraft is a practice of
enframing through which boundaries between the in-group and out-group are created and
controlled, ambiguities in the order of the domains of relevance solved and, on the other hand,
difference marked between man and ethnic community and the dangerous fields outside the
group. The practices of ethnocraft work primarily, not by solving problems and dangers in the
name of the ethnic population, but by inscribing problems and dangers that can be taken to be
exterior to the community. As Richard Ashley claims, without the inscription of external
dangers, there could be no well-bounded social identities (1989, p. 305). The practices of
ethnocraft work to constitute a coherent and sovereign identity for the ethnic group, securitise
that identity and rhetorically legitimise violent performances in the name of survival. Hence,
violent ethnic identification has a promising seedbed to grow.

Foundations for Conflict Resolution:
Void in Identification and Dialogical Social Practices

It should be noted that ethnic conflict or violent ethnic identification does not stop the process of
identification. In other words, identification continues through and in conflict, as argued earlier.
However, conflict situation narratives on ethnicity (e.g. ethnic origin, group memberships) tend
to become fixed, and this is often wrongly seen to imply fixed identities. Ethnic narratives in
conflict situations do seal off alternative ways to typify the world (see Cobb, 1994, pp. 54-56).
They seal off alternative interpretations which could destabilise the dominant interpretations.
Ethnic narratives seal off, for example, alternative self-definitions of the group and therewith
exclude alternative identifications, roles and modes of action. In the conflict situation, ethnic
narratives, thus, become rigid and readily reenacted. However, as Sara Cobb notes, "narrative
closure is never complete and contestation is inevitable", for example, "in mediation as
disputants refute, deny, and elaborate the discursive context in which they are located by self and
other" (1994, p. 56).
Neither does any political and social practice fully totalise society. There is always excess in
both social practice and the identification space it creates. As the Lacanian theory states, every
signifier fails to represent the subject and leaves, therefore, a residue. According to Aoki's
reading of Lacan, linguistic disruption (present in metaphors and metonyms) 'determines the
indeterminacy of the subject' (1995, p. 49) Excess leaves a residue on basis of which a
continuous constitution of identity takes place. Similarly, the social world is not entirely defined
in terms of repetitive and sedimented practices, because the social always overflows the
institutionalised frameworks. It follows, that the fullness of society in which the subject finds its
true identity is never finally achieved. Thus, a dimension of construction and creation is inherent
in all social practice - even despite the modern technological enframing of the world. This
constructive moment which exceeds the sedimented social practice creates a space for innovation
(Feldman, 1991, p. 5; Laclau, 1994, p. 3; more on Lacan's symbolic order and its indeterminacy
see Aoki, 1995).
The void created by excess and the lack of full narrative closure should be employed by conflict
resolution practices. The void in identification, the 'unfinished' political subjects it creates, the
failure of any social practice fully totalise a society and the openness of all narratives, bring
about space in which conflict resolution can produce change. It should be emphasised that
conflict resolution is a social and political practice among other practices in which political
agency, and subject is located. Conflict resolution can create new identification and political
sphere only if it is based on the creation of 'alternative' social practices and therewith new
political subject.
One possible way to create new practice is by producing discursive/dialogic institutions and
communities as alternative to instrumental institutions (see Benhabib, 1992; Gadamer, 1991;
Bakhtin, 1986). The dialogic community:
[...] anticipates non-violent strategies of conflict resolution as well as encouraging cooperative and
associative methods of problem-solving. It is a matter of political imagination as well as collective
fantasy to project institutions, practices and ways of life which promote non-violent conflict resolution
strategies and associative problem-solving methods (Benhabib, 1992, p. 49).
The dialogic community is a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is,
the willingness to reason from other's point of view and the sensitivity to hear their voice, is paramount.

The dialogic community in which dialogic relations are established is, thus, broader than dialogic speech
in the narrow sense of the word. The aim of dialogue is not consensus or unanimity, but the "anticipated
communication with others whom I know I must finally come to some agreement" (Benhabib, 1992, p.
9). In such a conversation, which is called by Benhabib also 'enlarged thinking,' the identity of the moral
self becomes reconceptualised by virtue of the nature of community.

Since there are no standpoints which are not dependent upon socially produced, shared and
approved ways to typify the world and subject positions, the aim of the establishment of the
dialogic community cannot be the finding of a set of universal moral principles, values or reason.
Rather, the emphasis should be on "sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships
within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue" (Benhabib, 1992, p.
38). An inability to come to a shared understanding is not a final outcome, but indicates that one
has been unable to bring the process of understanding to a conclusion. Dialogue is, by its nature,
repeatable and, by being repeated, it can be moved forward.
It should be noted, that official and formal negotiations seldom bring about a dialogic
framework, for they aim at reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of a
common interest in the context created by technology. Negotiations which rely solely on
instrumental bargaining on interests--or rather, interests turned into utilities--do not produce 'new
subjects' or new points of identification. Neither does the bargaining structure with the
manipulative (biased) mediator generate the dialogic community, because the biased third party
operates in a context of power politics and, therefore, in a context of cost-benefit calculations.
Official negotiations and biased mediation tend to re-enforce ethnic structures by appealing to a
limited set of negotiable interests and utilities which necessitates the existence of an assumed
coherent and sovereign identity; they necessitate agency entitled to resort instrumental reason
and institutions.
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